Airline Pricing under Different Market Conditions: Evidence from European Low-Cost Carriers by Volodymyr Bilotkach et al.
Copyright belongs to the author. Small sections of the text, not exceeding three paragraphs, can be used
provided proper acknowledgement is given.
The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA) was established in March 2007. RCEA is a private,
nonprofit organization dedicated to independent research in Applied and Theoretical Economics and related
fields.  RCEA  organizes  seminars  and  workshops,  sponsors  a  general  interest  journal The  Review  of
Economic Analysis, and organizes a biennial conference: The Rimini Conference in Economics and Finance
(RCEF) . The RCEA has a Canadian branch: The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in Canada (RCEA-
Canada). Scientific work contributed by the RCEA Scholars is published in the RCEA Working Papers and
Professional Report series.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. No responsibility for them should be attributed to
the Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis




University of California, Irvine, USA
Alberto A. Gaggero
University of Pavia, Italy
Claudio A. Piga
Loughborough University, UK
The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA)
AIRLINE PRICING UNDER DIFFERENT
MARKET CONDITIONS: EVIDENCE FROM
EUROPEAN LOW-COST CARRIERSAirline Pricing under Dierent Market Conditions:











Traditional theories of airline pricing maintain that fares monotonically increase
as fewer seats remain available on a ight. A fortiori, this implies a monotonically
increasing temporal prole of fares. In this paper, we exploit the presence of drops
in oered fares over time as an indicator of an active yield management interven-
tion by two main European Low-Cost Carriers observed daily during the period
June 2002 - June 2003. Our results indicate that yield management is eective
in raising a ight's load factor. Furthermore, yield management interventions are
more intense, and generate a stronger impact, on more competitive routes: one
possible interpretation is that a reduction in competitive pressure allows the carri-
ers to adopt a more standardized approach to pricing. Similarly, we nd that yield
management interventions are more eective in raising the load factor on routes
where the customer mix is more heterogenous (i.e., it includes passengers travel-
ing for leisure, business and for family matters). On markets with homogeneous
customer base, no robust yield management eect was observed.
JEL Classication: D22, L11, L93.
Keywords: Easyjet, Intertemporal Pricing, Panel Data, Ryanair, Yield Man-
agement.
1 Introduction
Pricing in the airline industry is highly complex. One result of this complexity is sub-
stantial price dispersion: passengers end up paying vastly dierent prices for an other-
wise identical service. Borenstein and Rose (1994) ascribe dispersion in airline fares to
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1two main sources: peak-load pricing (both systematic and stochastic), and price dis-
crimination.1 In practical terms, the airlines operationalize the latter by introducing a
number of segmenting devices known as \fences" (e.g., the Saturday night stayover and
the advance-purchase requirements). Because fares have to be set before demand is
realized, airlines deal with peak-load pricing by practicing \yield management" (here-
inafter, YM), which refers to pricing perishable xed capacity under uncertain demand
to maximize load factor and revenue. As Dana (1999a) illustrates in a model where
market segmentation and price discrimination are not technically feasible, systematic
peak-load pricing can be eectively tackled by YM techniques that require reliable
forecasts on the number of possible demand states and their probability of occurring.
However, in the event the forecasts turn out to be particularly imprecise and/or if un-
expected contingencies arise, the need to deal with stochastic peak-load pricing may
induce airlines to revise the pricing schedule they devised under systematic peak-load
conditions. This is particularly important when the actual demand is much lower than
expected so that, in the absence of any rectifying intervention that shifts at least some
fares downward, the aircraft would be likely to depart with many empty seats.2
In this paper, we investigate whether YM interventions in the form of fare reduc-
tions, which we identify as persistent \price drops" over time, are eective in raising a
ight's realized load factor. In particular, we focus on whether an airline's YM eorts
have a stronger impact in market situations where the need to revise a previously set
pricing schedule is more likely; i.e., in competitive markets, where revision may be in-
duced by an unpredicted change in competitors' pricing behavior; and in markets with
a more heterogeneous demand, so that fares need to adjust to a dierent mix of travel-
ers's types, whose realization over time may be highly idiosyncratic. To our knowledge,
this paper represents the rst study relating oered price prole in the airline industry
as the departure day nears to the ight's nal number of passengers. In fact, it is
dicult to obtain ocial statistics on single ights' load factors.
A typical problem that arises in empirical studies of airline pricing is that YM
1Under systematic peak-load pricing, the high- or low-demand periods can be predicted with su-
ciently accurate precision, while stochastic peak-load pricing entails the management of demand con-
ditions that could not be determined a priori.
2Arguably, the nancial incentive to revise a ight's pricing schedule downward is larger than in the
case where demand turns out to be higher than expected. Firstly, an alternative to lowering fares could
be canceling the ight, a tactic that, in Europe, incurs penalties if excessively practiced. Secondly, the
perishability of seats implies that any paid seats is obviously preferable to an empty seat. Thirdly,
states of high demand are automatically managed within systematic peak-load pricing schedules by
assigning very high fares to the last batches of seats, i.e., those that are generally least likely to be sold.
2induced by demand uncertainty is intertwined with price discrimination strategies.
Indeed, airlines typically oer contracts, which include price and refundability clauses.
Usually, cheaper tickets are not refundable, and travelers must pay a premium if they
would like to retain the possibility of adjusting their travel plans after buying the
ticket. This makes dierently priced tickets not directly comparable. Additionally,
the airlines often price the same seat dierently, depending on whether the customer
travels one-way or round-trip. In this paper, we make use of a unique dataset of
price quotes by the two leading European Low-Cost Carriers (LCCs). The advantage
of our dataset is that all the tickets are oered as strictly non-refundable contracts,
irrespective of the price, and the airlines do not practice any discrimination between
one-way and round-trip customers. Additionally, our data allows us to abstract from
pricing-in-network considerations, as the carriers involved only sell tickets for point-to-
point services. Specically, we observe both the evolution of price quotes for a number
of ights as the departure date nears, and the realized load factors of those ights; hence
we can study how realized load factors are inuenced by YM interventions represented
by unexpected price reductions observed at various time intervals prior to a ight's
departure.
The hypothesis that price drops are designed to increase a ight's realized load
factor nds support in our data, within an econometric ight-level xed eects model
that accounts for the potential endogeneity of the price drops variable. The eect of YM
is particularly pronounced on competitive routes, and on the routes where customers
are heterogeneous (i.e., represent a mix of business and leisure travelers).
This study oers the rst empirical analysis of yield management in economics
literature. Our results indicate that active YM interventions by the airlines are eec-
tive in raising the ight load factor. We must however note two caveats here. First,
intertemporal price discrimination is not an alternative hypothesis to our contention,
and our nding that YM is practiced eectively does not mean that the airlines do
not price discriminate. It is simply that, according to the available information on
how airline set their fares, the temporal price discrimination approach is largely a xed
eect, i.e., a similar template is applied across daily ights operated on the same route
sharing the same time of departure. Furthermore, the use of relevant instruments is
also designed to purge the yield management variable of possible other time-varying
ight-specic eects. Second, we do not claim to have conducted a completed analysis
of the full range of yield management practices. Indeed, we only focus on one partic-
3ular manifestation, i.e., sustained price drops induced by stochastic peak-load pricing
considerations, but we also control for other more traditional forms of yield manage-
ment such as those discussed in Dana (1999a, 1999b), where the emphasis lies on how
fares should be adjusted to reect systematic peak-load pricing considerations. Since
we only deal with nal realized load factors, we cannot study whether the management
of peak-load pricing varies with market conditions; addressing this issue will probably
require more detailed data on how fares change as a plane lls up.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses relevant
literature. This is followed by discussion of our approach to measure yield management.
Sections 4, 5, and 6 discuss data, empirical strategy, and results, respectively. Section
7 concludes. Some secondary results are in the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
The theoretical literature on airline pricing has focussed on YM techniques aimed at
implementing systematic peak-load pricing and advance-purchase discounts at the sin-
gle ight level. As Dana (1999b) illustrates in a model with demand uncertainty and
perishable assets, systematic peak-load pricing can be eectively managed by dividing
the total of the aircraft's seats into groups or \buckets" (McGill and Van Ryzin, 1999),
whose number and size depend on the number of possible demand states and their
probability of occurring; and by assigning to each bucket a fare whose level is inversely
related with the probability that a seat in that group is sold.3 A similar mechanism is
proposed in Dana (1999a) to shift demand from peak to o-peak ights when airlines
do not know ex-ante for which ight the peak will be realized: because in equilibrium
the airline restricts the size of the low-priced buckets, some consumers choose to y at
their least preferred time.
Advance-purchase discounts (APD, hereafter) provide a simple way to screen con-
sumers by their demand uncertainty. Gale and Holmes (1993) argue that in a monopoly
with capacity constraints and perfectly predictable demand, APD are used to divert
demand from peak periods to o-peak periods in order to maximize prots. By doing
so, the airlines price discriminate across customers on the basis of their price elasticity
and time valuation. Similarly, when the demand is uncertain ADP help to improve
protability by spreading customers evenly across ights before the peak period is
3Furthermore, Dana (1999b) provides theoretical support to some of the previously mentioned em-
pirical studies where price dispersion is found to be larger in competitive markets.
4known (Gale and Holmes, 1992). Finally, Dana (1998) demonstrates that in compet-
itive markets where prices are set before the demand is known, the application of a
\low-before-high-fares" strategy is driven by the fact that consumers with more certain
demand are more likely to buy in advance. More recently, M oller and Watanabe (2010)
have compared APD with clearance sales, and illustrated how the former are more
appropriate when a consumer faces no or little risk of being rationed.
To sum up, the highly unanimous conclusion from the theoretical airline pricing
literature is a strong support for fares being monotonically increasing over time. Indeed,
although the results in Dana (1999a and 1999b) are obtained by ruling out any form of
intertemporal price discrimination, they can be seen as observationally equivalent to it,
since prices increase monotonically as buckets are lled, and hence a fortiori they have
to increase over time. This property is largely due to the assumption that demand is
allocated by rationing (as in Prescott (1975) and Eden (1990)) and not market clearing;
alternatively put, under this assumption pricing decisions are set once and for all, i.e.,
the airlines are irrevocably committed to follow them. The frequent observation in our
dataset of price drops is thus in stark contrast with the monotonic property. A possible
way to reconcile the theoretical literature on airline pricing with empirical observation
follows from the consideration that the airlines may be adopting the two-stage process
indicated in European Commission (2007). According to this process, a pricing prole,
which denes the buckets' properties as well as any temporal variation, is initially set
for each ight. Subsequently, a yield manager may choose to intervene by reducing the
fares in order to try to clear the market. This latter aspect is largely consistent with
our denition of price drops as YM interventions.
In the extant literature, as the previous discussion highlights, YM often takes a
multi-faceted connotation. Dana (1999b) indicates that YM can be used as a tool
to implement intertemporal, second and third-degree price discrimination; but it also
implements peak-load pricing and an inventory control system for coping with uncertain
demand for a perishable asset. Generally, as the `price discrimination like' outcomes
appear where the rms do not have market power, disentangling the motives behind
the observed pricing behavior by the airlines, and attributing them to a specic type
of YM becomes an intriguing topic for research that is often hindered by limitations in
the data availability.
Although the theoretical literature on yield management is rather extensive and well
developed, its empirical counterpart is scarce, recent, and does not oer any unambigu-
5ous results. This is mostly due to the scarcity of appropriate data, and the complexity
of the data generating processes. Two recent studies attempt to test yield management
theories of pricing in the airline industry. The studies use dierent datasets, and arrive
at fundamentally dierent results. Escobari and Gan (2007) collect fare quotes for a
number of ights, tracing evolution of oered prices as the departure day nears. This
approach is similar to what we do in our study. The authors also derive a proxy for the
load factor at each date of price data collection to evaluate the probability that the ight
will be sold out. The main nding is that lower selling probability yields higher price
quote, as predicted by the peak-load, inventory control models. In contrast, Puller et
al. (2009) argue that the observed price pattern is consistent with price discrimination
rather than YM. Both these studies, however, use data generated by a more complex
process than the one described by any of the models in the literature. Both papers
deal with pricing of non-stop one-way ights operated by the network airlines, without
taking into consideration the well-known discrimination between one-way and round-
trip passengers. Also, seats on the same aircraft are occupied by origin-destination and
transit passengers, and presence of transit passengers can aect pricing of the origin-
destination tickets. Further, while Puller et al. (2009) are able to control for various
ticket restrictions, they had to resort to estimating the ight-level load factors from
their data and another dataset which provides more aggregate information. Escobari
and Gan (2007), on the other hand, do not give adequate consideration to the possible
dierences in restrictions attached to the fare quotes in their sample.
Also related to our study is the literature on price dispersion in industries char-
acterized by costly capacity, asset perishability, and demand uncertainty. Studies of
price dispersion in the airline industry include Borenstein and Rose (1994), Gerardi
and Shapiro (2009), Gaggero and Piga (2011), Stavins (2001), Hayes and Ross (1998),
Hernandez and Wiggins (2009). Of these, Hayes and Ross (1998) and Stavins (2001)
suggest the link between the strategies attributed to yield management and observed
price dispersion. However, neither of the two studies had a rich enough dataset to oer
a more comprehensive analysis of the issue.
Our dataset, although it lacks information on the ight occupancy at the moment
fares were retrieved, presents the advantage that it is generated from a setting which is
very close to the one actually modeled by theoretical studies. Specically, carriers in our
sample focus exclusively on point-to-point travel; they do not discriminate between one-
way and round-trip ticket purchasers; and neither oer refundable tickets, nor employ
6other `fences'. Importantly, we observe ight-level realized load factors. Therefore,
our empirical strategy diers from the one employed by Escobari and Gan (2007), and
Puller et al. (2009) in that we focus on the impact of evolution of the price quotes prior
to the departure date on the realized load factor. In this way, we are able to study
whether and to what extent YM, dened as a revision to a pre-determined pricing
prole, is practiced by the carriers and how eective it is in raising a ight's load
factor.
3 Methodology
Our empirical strategy involves using the ight's realized load factor as the dependent
variable. At the most general level, load factor is the outcome of the level of demand,
market competition, and the airline's strategy. When setting its price, the airline is
driven by what it knows about the potential passengers' willingness to pay, as well
as by the realized demand. As far as the passengers' willingness to pay is concerned,
we assume that the airline takes into account the correlation between the customers'
willingness to pay and how early a booking is made. That is, more price sensitive
leisure travelers, whose demand uncertainty is solved earlier, book their ight before
less price sensitive business travelers. The airline can take advantage of this pattern,
practicing intertemporal price discrimination.
Therefore, prima facie, our proposed measure of YM intervention based on price
drops appears to be observationally equivalent to intertemporal price discrimination.
However, we can separate and gauge the net impact of YM interventions by exploiting
a number of aspects that characterize the airlines' pricing behavior. Specically, the
temporal prole of fares induced by discriminatory purposes tends to be ight-specic
and is generally repeated over time. By denition, price drops induced by YM inter-
ventions are idiosyncratic, and therefore ights with such interventions will exhibit a
dierent temporal prole. Furthermore, given the large evidence of fares increasing
sharply in the last ten days from departure, we argue that sustained price drops as the
departure date nears are consistent with yield management, but not with intertemporal
price discrimination.
We essentially suppose that the airline practicing intertemporal price discrimination
sets its oered prices according to some prole, which is determined based on some av-
eraged information about demand. Then, if demand realization prole is dierent from
7that expected `average', the airline uses yield management to adjust prices. Specically,
when seats are not selling as fast as the prole has predicted, the carrier either post-
pones the planned price increase, or lowers the price. However, because the last buckets
of seats are already priced so as to reect high peaks in demand, it is unlikely that when
customers arrive at a higher rate than anticipated, a carrier will modify a preset price
prole, which already includes automatic increases. Dana (1999a) indeed suggested
that booking limits are relaxed more frequently than they are tightened, meaning that
yield managers are more likely to react when demand is below projections than when
seats are sold faster than expected. Overall, this approach is largely consistent with
the description of the YM systems operated by Ryanair and Aer Lingus made by the
European Commission in its investigation of the merger proposal that was blocked in
2007.4 The Commission emphasizes how these carriers adopt a set of standard \tem-
plates" (i.e., a combination of buckets' prices and sizes), whose choice depends on a
ight's and its route's characteristics. There are expected to remain largely invariant
unless, as discussed above, realized demand diverges signicantly from its forecast.
The issue is then to identify the above-mentioned deviations from the average in
the data. This is not a straightforward task, since it is not clear which - if any - oered
price trajectory in our dataset represents the average intertemporal price discrimination
pattern. In light of the above suggestion that yield managers are likely to respond to
demand realization when it is below its projection, then the only deviation from the
average price trajectory, which we can clearly see in the data, involves cases of drops in
the oered prices over consecutive periods. Price drops will be the focus of our analysis,
aimed at identifying and quantifying the eects of YM on realized load factors.
Before we continue with the discussion of our dataset, we need to remind the reader
that we will not be able to oer the comprehensive judgement of the eectiveness of YM
in our study. Our investigation will, however, inform us about and quantify the eects
of one particular manifestation of YM. Also, while the goal of YM is to both increase
the load factors and maximize revenue, our paper focuses on the former objective, for
lack of the detailed revenue data.
4See Commission Decision (2007) on Case No COMP/M.4439 { Ryanair/Aer Lingus, pp. 108-109
84 Data
Our dataset consists of three parts. First, we use information on oered prices (fare
quotes in British Sterling $) of the two leading European low cost carriers (LCCs):
Ryanair and Easyjet.5 The price quotes have been collected on 130 routes 6 both within
the United Kingdom, and between the United Kingdom and a number of European
countries.7 We have used an \electronic spider" to collect fare quotes by connecting
directly to the web sites of the two leading LCCs daily from June 2002 until June 2003.
Overall, we have identied 843 unique ight codes, served by the two carriers. Fare
quotes were collected 1, 4, 7, 10, 14, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56, 63 and 70 days prior to the
departure day for each ight code. Each of these is denoted as a \booking day". The
highest frequency of late booking days is meant to allow possible APD eects, an issue
that appears to be particularly relevant for both these airlines, as illustrated in Dobson
and Piga (2011). Overall, we have collected thirteen fare quotes for each ight.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics (average fare quotes and corresponding stan-
dard deviations) depending on how far in advance the fare quotes have been collected.
The numbers are reported both for the entire sample, and for sub-samples of competi-
tive and not competitive routes; see Section 6.2 below for a detailed discussion of these
sub-samples.
We can infer from Table 1 that price quotes depict a generally increasing trend as the
ight date nears; and that prices tend to be higher on routes that are less competitive.
Both results hold also when we analyze each carrier separately. Furthermore, our
dataset includes a potentially non-trivial number of cases of decreases in oered price
over time. Specically, the average price quote 21 days prior to departure is lower than
the same a week before (28 days prior to the ight date). Although this is mostly
driven by data from EasyJet, a similar fall over consecutive booking days is observed
for Ryanair between 63 and 56 days from departure.
The other two parts of the dataset are derived from ocial statistics. The second
data source we use is the information on realized ight load factors. Specically, the
5Ryanair and Easyjet are two largest low-cost carriers in Europe. Ryanair is based in Ireland, and
Easyjet is headquartered in the United Kingdom. However, both carriers perform services throughout
Europe. In 2010, Ryanair carried over 70 million passengers; Easyjet's total for the same year was over
45 million. By this parameter, the carriers are both among the top ve European airlines.
6Those routes are not the universe of markets served by Ryanair and Easyjet, however they are
randomly selected to be good representatives of the entire route-population.
7Austria, Belgium, Check Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland
9Table 1: Average Price across Booking Days
Booking Full sample Easyjet Easyjet Ryanair Ryanair
Days All Routes Low Comp. High Comp. Low Comp. High Comp.
1 82.6 79.4 71.8 97.7 75.9
(43.86) (39.38) (35.11) (45.13) (48.3)
4 62.8 62.9 56.6 74.4 53.1
(37.21) (32.08) (30.53) (41.63) (36.63)
7 49.9 54.9 46.3 56.4 40.4
(35.2) (30.17) (26.55) (40.84) (35.78)
10 46.3 50.0 42.7 52.6 38.4
(34.73) (28.79) (27.49) (39.94) (36.07)
14 41.6 51.2 40.6 44.5 31.3
(32.69) (31.73) (28.66) (35.46) (30.49)
21 38.2 50.1 38.4 39.4 27.3
(31.37) (32.5) (29.07) (32.57) (27.39)
28 39.0 56.4 42.0 37.1 25.1
(35.04) (39.62) (34.74) (33.52) (26.64)
35 34.5 52.9 38.5 31.2 20.8
(30.15) (35.79) (30.92) (25.8) (21.29)
42 32.4 49.5 35.6 29.2 20.6
(28.43) (33.91) (28.29) (24.62) (21.75)
49 31.1 46.7 34.5 28.3 19.7
(27.22) (32.54) (28.49) (22.89) (20.3)
56 29.1 45.8 32.8 25.2 18.2
(25.65) (31.92) (26.32) (20.51) (18.33)
63 30.5 43.9 33.1 28.5 20.7
(25.77) (30.24) (27.42) (22.27) (19.79)
70 28.6 41.9 30.8 25.9 19.7
(24.69) (30.04) (25.31) (21.45) (18.39)
(a) Average price across booking days, standard errors in parentheses.
(b) Price is a one-way fare, measured in British Sterling ($) excluding taxes and airport charges.
(c) For the denition of low competitive routes (Low Comp.) and highly competitive routes (High
Comp.), see Section 6.2 of this paper.
10U.K. Civil Aviation Authority provided daily data on all the ights operated by our two
LCCs, Ryanair and EasyJet. This dataset contains information on the ight frequency,
as well as on the number of passengers and the available seat capacity of each ight
code departing on a given day. Constructing load factors from this data is a trivial
exercise, where the number of nal passengers is divided by the aircraft's capacity.
In our dataset, the average load factor is 78 percent, with a standard deviation of
15.71 percent. The highly strategic nature of such information leads the Civil Aviation
Authority to the decision to stop selling data with a daily frequency. Therefore, we also
use monthly data, always from the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority, to identify the full
set of competitors on the route, and to eventually classify the routes into those with
high and low levels of competition (see section 6.2).
Finally, the third source we will use is the International Passenger Survey (IPS),
which is prepared and managed by the U.K. Oce for National Statistics and dis-
tributed via the U.K. Data Archive. The survey is a random sample of about 2 percent
of passengers entering/leaving the U.K. by air. It provides quarterly information on ex-
penditure levels and passenger characteristics, including the purpose of the journey. For
each route, we aggregate the survey information across carriers to derive a set of mea-
sures indicating the percentage of passengers traveling for a specic reason (business,
holiday, visiting friends & relatives). This enables us to determine whether passengers
on a route are homogeneous (i.e., traveling predominantly on business of for pleasure)
or heterogeneous (representing a mix of business and leisure trac). As we will discuss
below, we dene routes as homogeneous if over two thirds of the passengers surveyed
belonged to one of the broad categories (business or pleasure travelers). Most of the
routes with homogeneous passenger demand represent leisure or tourist markets.
5 Econometric Model
The specication we will estimate is as follows:
LoadFactorijmt = 1AveragePriceijrmt + 2YieldManagementijrmt + (1)




kWeekdaykt + ijrm + "ijrmt
Where t indexes time (day of the month), i represents a ight code operated by
11an airline j on route r in a given month m. Note that under this panel specication,
market structure is given, therefore the xed eect estimator guarantees our estimates
not to be biased by any inuence of competition.8 The use of monthly panels also
takes into account possible seasonal eects, which in turn may be associated with a
particular choice of the pricing template.
The dependent variable, LoadFactor, is the ight's realized occupancy rate, previ-
ously dened.
The key variables of interests are AveragePrice and YieldManagement. The former
is the simple average price of the 13 fares posted on the respective booking days (70,
63... 1 days before the ight's scheduled departure day). We use this measure to
control for the `general' (i.e., average) eect of fares on load factor. As one of our
robustness checks, we will later recalculate this average price applying dierent weights
to individual quotes.
YieldManagement variable measures the number of price drops during the booking
period and thus aims to capture the eect of the yield manager's intervention. To
focus on price drops that are clearly non-random, and realizing that, for early booking
days, a single price drop may reect the chosen pricing prole of a carrier's template,
we dene a sustained price drop in the following way. For booking dates from 70 to
21 days before the departure, price drop is identied as the instance of a lower fare
quote for two consecutive dates of data collection. That is, we count a price drop if
the fare P at time t is such that: Pt  Pt 1  $5  Pt 2  $5. For booking days from
14 to 1 day prior to departure, any price drop counts, i.e., a price drop is recorded if
Pt  Pt 1   $5. Thus, the price drop, in addition to being persistent over two early
booking days, has to be also economically relevant, and be at least equal to $5.
From Table 2, the following stylized facts stand out. First, price can drop at any
time before the ight departure date; the highest frequency of price decreases is observed
between four and three weeks prior to departure, when quoted price drops for nearly
three out of ten ights. Second, we are least likely to observe falling fare quotes within
the last ten days prior to ight departure. Third, the relative magnitude of price
decreases is not trivial - from nearly 25 to almost 60 percent of the fare9. Fourth,
Easyjet on average exhibits smaller percentage price drops than Ryanair. Furthermore,
8This is because airlines keep their ight schedule xed for a period which is usually longer than a
month (typically airlines operate a winter schedule and a summer schedule).
9Recall, however, that we are only recording price drops higher than $5, which already represents
6 to 18 percent of the average fare quote
12the intertemporal prole of the two carriers appears to be dierent; for each carrier,
the percentage of ights with price drops varies across booking periods. Finally, the
largest price drop observed in our sample is over $200; however, the distribution of price
decreases is understandably skewed: e.g., the 90th and 95th percentile are respectively
$40 and $60.
On average, we observe 1.12 sustained price drops per ight, with the standard
deviation of 0.95. The highest number of sustained price drops in our sample is 7.
About 30% of the ights in our sample have no sustained price drops, and there is no
dierence in this measure across the two carriers in our sample. Overall, about seven
out of ten ights in our sample exhibit at least one sustained drop in the price quotes
as the departure day nears.
13Table 2: Price drops
Booking Days Variables' list Easyjet Ryanair Total
Average Price Drop , in % -32.6 -37.7 -36.5
4-1 Flights with price drops, in % 3.6 8.9 6.5
Observations 28748 36563 65311
Average Price Drop , in % -30.9 -35.4 -34.4
7-4 Flights with price drops, in % 3.4 9.4 6.8
Observations 54817 71363 126180
Average Price Drop , in % -37.9 -41.4 -40.3
10-7 Flights with price drops, in % 8.0 15.2 12.0
Observations 52378 66892 119270
Average Price Drop , in % -24.3 -38.5 -29.8
14-10 Flights with price drops, in % 23.8 11.9 17.1
Observations 54820 71371 126191
Average Price Drop , in % -28.7 -46.1 -39.1
21-14 Flights with price drops, in % 17.9 20.5 19.3
Observations 54837 71367 126204
Average Price Drop , in % -28.7 -49.9 -38.2
28-21 Flights with price drops, in % 36.1 22.5 28.4
Observations 54787 71129 125916
Average Price Drop , in % -28.4 -51.0 -42.5
35-28 Flights with price drops, in % 15.3 19.4 17.6
Observations 54162 70933 125095
Average Price Drop , in % -33.9 -52.8 -47.1
42-35 Flights with price drops, in % 12.7 22.6 18.3
Observations 54310 70687 124997
Average Price Drop , in % -33.2 -52.3 -46.0
49-42 Flights with price drops, in % 14.1 21.7 18.4
Observations 53380 70943 124323
Average Price Drop , in % -33.0 -53.7 -45.8
56-49 Flights with price drops, in % 15.5 19.1 17.5
Observations 52912 69513 122425
Average Price Drop , in % -32.5 -58.4 -50.5
63-56 Flights with price drops, in % 15.2 26.2 21.4
Observations 53147 71066 124213
Average Price Drop , in % -30.8 -56.4 -46.9
70-63 Flights with price drops, in % 13.9 18.3 16.4
Observations 51448 66451 117899
(a) Price Drop is dened as Pt  Pt 1   $5.
14The remaining variables control for potential peak demand periods. Xmas, Easter
and MidAugust are three indicator variables for ights departing during the week(s)
of Christmas and New Year (winter peak), Easter (spring peak), and August 15th
(summer peak), respectively.
Weekday variables are indicators for the day of the week, on which the ight is
scheduled (with Wednesdays being the omitted category). Thus, the coecients on
these dummies show how dierent load factors are on average on a given day of the
week relative to those for Wednesday ights.
The ight-code specic heterogeneity (e.g., Ryanair ight FR3768 from London
Luton to Girona) will be captured by the corresponding ight-code xed eects ijrm.
Then, "ijrmt represents the idiosyncratic errors that may be correlated both serially
and with errors for other observations within a route. To correctly account for these
properties of disturbances in estimation, our standard errors will be clustered by route
and week. This will capture the possibility of ight-specic demand shocks on a given
day aecting the demand for all of the ights on the route in a given week. For instance,
a large group booking for a Wednesday morning ight may raise fares for this ight,
and lead to customers switching to other ights of the same airline on nearby days, or
to ights of the competing carrier(s).
Our biggest econometric challenge comes from the fact that unobserved shocks
aecting load factors will also aect the average price. Consequently, unobserved shocks
aecting our dependent variable can also inuence the implementation of YM by the
airlines. Thus, since both of our key independent variables are correlated with the error
term, we address this problem by using an instrumental variable approach.
We use the following variables as instruments:
 Price of jet fuel (obtained from the US Department of Transportation web site):
this variable is an airline cost shifter. Using cost shifters as instruments for price
is a standard practice.
 Number of booking days (NOT ight departure days) falling in the holiday period
(weeks of Christmas, Easter, and August 15th). The airlines can expect fewer
bookings on those days, which may aect their exercise of YM.
 Average number of price drops for the ights departing within the two weeks
preceding and following the current week. For example, for a ight departing on
a Monday, we construct this instrument as the average of fare drops for the same
15ight departing on the two previous and the two next Mondays. This exercise is in
the spirit of using lags and leads of the endogenous variables as instruments. More
importantly, this instrument is meant to purge the regressor of the eect induced
by the carrier's use of a standard template on a given ight, as indicated in EU
Competition Commission (2007), thus allowing the identication of the impact
of idiosyncratic YM interventions. In other words, the instrument is likely to be
correlated with the variable YieldManagement, but it should not be with "ijrmt,
since the latter is unlikely to be inuenced by shocks in demand that have aected
one- or two-weeks old ights, and it is unlikely to inuence similarly distanced
future ights.
To conrm the validity of our instruments, we use the Hansen test for overidentifying
restrictions. If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis, then all instruments used are
considered exogenous. We will report this test in all the tables. To anticipate results,
the Hansen test clearly supports our choice of instruments - the null hypothesis is never
rejected at conventional signicance levels. To demonstrate that the instruments we
have chosen are not weak (that is, that they are actually correlated with the endogenous
variables), rst-stage regression results for the two-stage least squares estimation for
some of our specications are presented in Table 7 in the Appendix. This is done in
addition to employing the Cragg and Donald (1993) test. This test has been suggested
by Stock and Yogo (2005) as a test for the presence of weak instruments. This is
essentially an F-test, with null hypothesis being underidentication - largely rejected
in all our estimates.
6 Results
Our econometric strategy will be as follows. We will start by presenting results for
the entire sample. Both the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and Two-Stage Least
Squares (2SLS) estimation results will be reported, to demonstrate that the use of the
instrumental variable technique fundamentally changes the coecients on the key in-
dependent variables. Next, we will examine whether the eect of YM on load factor
depends on the level of competition and on consumer heterogeneity. A priori we expect
a higher impact of YM on more competitive routes, and on markets with more het-
erogeneous customers, as demand on these routes will likely be more variable. Finally,
we will use dierent measures of average oered price, as well as the simple range of
16oered prices, as robustness checks of our results.
6.1 Full Sample
This section presents the results of the data analysis, carried out according to the
strategy outlined in the previous section of the paper. Estimation results of equation
(1) for the entire sample are reported in Table 3. Column (1) reports the GLS Fixed
Eects estimates, which are included primarily to gauge the impact of the instruments.
To check for the presence of endogeneity we apply the Hausman (1978) test between
the models \2SLS" and \GLS Fixed Eects". The test produces a 2 value equal to
21.42, which is statistically signicant at a critical value below 5%; hence, we reject the
null hypothesis of exogeneity. Cragg and Donald (1993) test results suggest that our
instruments are not weak. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 report 2SLS xed eects
results. Column (3) presents results of the specication using the natural logarithm of
load factor as dependent variable.
Relative to those in Column (1), the results reported in Column (2) demonstrate
that there is a change in the sign and signicance of the coecient on the YM variable,
when the instrumental variable technique is applied. When we do not account for en-
dogeneity of this variable, we nd that more price drops are associated with lower load
factors. Such a negative correlation is consistent with the view that a larger number of
price drops is likely to be observed in ights whose performance is worse than expected.
However, as it is standard in these cases, the GLS is not consistently estimating the
causal eect of the YM interventions. Indeed, the GLS estimates measures the dier-
ence in the expected load factors of two arbitrary ights with the same characteristics,
except that their numbers of price drops diers by one unit. What we are interested
in measuring is the expected load factor dierence if on an arbitrary ight the yield
manager (for some exogenous reasons) decides to increase the number of price drops
by one unit.
Interestingly, when endogeneity is taken into account, the causal interpretation of
YieldManagement is in accordance to our expected hypothesis: a price drop appears
to be eective in raising the load factors. Furthermore, moving the attention to the
other endogenous regressor, a higher average oered price is associated with higher load
factors. This is in line with the theoretical predictions in Dana (1999b) that carriers
ex-ante allocate seats into buckets (or fare classes) whose price increases as the plane
lls up.
17Table 3: Full sample estimates
(1) (2) (3)
GLS FE 2SLS FE 2SLS FE
Average price 0.270*** 0.226*** 0.003***
(0.005) (0.077) (0.001)
Yield management -0.229*** 1.951** 0.039**
(0.066) (0.983) (0.017)
Winter peak (Xmas) 0.548 1.048 0.009
(0.657) (1.792) (0.029)
Spring peak (Easter) 1.049** 1.550 0.021
(0.443) (1.096) (0.018)
Summer peak (Mid-August) 1.283*** 1.034** 0.014**
(0.338) (0.449) (0.007)
Sundays 0.916*** 1.376 0.019
(0.254) (1.315) (0.022)
Mondays 3.469*** 3.970*** 0.066***
(0.205) (0.830) (0.014)
Tuesdays 0.183 0.257 0.005
(0.168) (0.204) (0.004)
Thursdays 2.585*** 2.679*** 0.045***
(0.160) (0.467) (0.008)
Fridays 2.252*** 2.578** 0.037**
(0.225) (1.074) (0.018)
Saturdays 1.755*** 1.956** 0.034**
(0.222) (0.946) (0.016)
R2 0.148 0.127 0.084
Cragg-Donald F-stat 116.791 117.241
Hansen 2 1.909 2.333
Hansen p-value 0.167 0.127
Observations 109097 109079 109071
(a) Model (1) Generalized Least Squares Fixed-Eect. Models (2) and (3) Two-Stage Least Squares.
(b) Dependent variable: Load factor for Models (1) and (2), log(Load factor) for Model (3).
(c) Estimation technique: ight-code xed eects with standard errors in parentheses, robust to het-
eroscedasticity and serial correlation, clustered by route-week.
(d) See text for the list of instruments for Average price and Yield management.
(e) Coecients *** statistically signicant at 1%, ** at 5% and *at 10%.
18The magnitudes of the estimated eects of price and YM are as follows. Taking
the coecient on AveragePrice in the model \2SLS"of Column (2), an increase of
AveragePrice by the interquartile dierence (i.e., 3rd quartile - 1st quartile) is associated
with a raise of LoadFactor by about 7 percent. Also (based on 2SLS result), one
standard deviation increase in the YieldManagement variable raises LoadFactor by
about 2 percent. Recalling that the standard deviation of our YM variable is close to
1, we can re-interpret our result as suggesting that an additional price drop increases
load factor by about 2 percent. For a typical Ryanair's 189-seat aircraft, this translates
into about 3.8 additional seats sold as a result of the application of an YM approach
aimed at lowering the oered price in response to unusually slow realization of demand,
holding everything else - including average price - constant.
As far as the remaining control variables are concerned, we observe that load factors
are higher on average on certain days of the week, and during some of the higher demand
periods. More interestingly the positive sign found across the six dummy variables
representing the day of the week suggests that ights to depart on Wednesdays have
the lowest load factor.10 For this reason, we will refer to this case as the \Wednesday-
eect". Finally, it is noteworthy that using a specication in log of the LoadFactor
variable - Column (3) in Table 3 - does not alter the qualitative interpretations of the
results.
The results reported in Table 3 provide the backdrop against which we investi-
gate the central issue of the paper, namely, whether the eect of an intervention by a
yield manager depends on the extent of competition, and on the degree of consumer
heterogeneity in a route.
6.2 Competition and Consumer Heterogeneity
To address these questions, we recall that, within the same month, market structure
is xed. Similarly, as indicated in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), travelers' motivation
remains constant over time, with some routes being predominantly used by leisure
travelers, while others by a more heterogeneous mixture of passengers. To study both
aspects, we re-estimate equation (1) for the following sub-samples. In the rst cate-
gorization, we dierentiate the sample according to the extent of competition on the
market. Competition is measured using the number of airlines present both at the
10Recall that Wednesdays is the reference category of the day-of-the-week dummy group, and there-
fore the positive sign on the other dummies measures the average increase in the load factor of the
observed day with respect to Wednesday.
19route level and at the city-pair level, so that if a route is a monopoly within a very
competitive city-pair, it is classied as competitive. We dene a route as an airport
pair (e.g., London Gatwick and Rome Fiumicino). A city-pair includes all the airports
serving the two cities. Thus, a route may be operated by a single carrier, but the latter
may face competition from other airlines operating in the same city-pair. We dene a
market to be highly competitive if there are at least three carriers on the city-pair mar-
ket, and at least two airlines are present on the airport-pair market, or if the number of
airlines present in the city-pair is larger than or equal to ve, irrespective of the number
of airlines serving the given airport-pair market. The average Herndahl index across
city-pair markets in this sub-sample of competitive routes is 0.28. By contrast, the
city-pair market Herndahl index for the sub-set of non-competitive markets is 0.56.
The applied classication of markets between competitive and non-competitive splits
our sample into two roughly equally sized sub-samples.
In the other categorization, we dierentiate our sample with respect to the extent
of demand heterogeneity, which we capture by considering the purpose of travel re-
ported by interviewees participating to the U.K. International Passenger Survey. More
precisely, for each quarter we measure the share of passengers reporting the following
purpose for the journey: holiday and leisure, visiting friends & relatives, and business.
We dene a route to be homogeneous, if over two thirds of travelers on the respective
city-pair market belong to either of the three categories of passengers identied above.
Otherwise, we classify the market as heterogeneous. The two resulting sub-samples
are again nearly equal in size; with the sub-sample for homogeneous market containing
somewhat more observations. Most of the markets classied as homogeneous happen
to be leisure/tourist routes.
The results of estimating equation (1) on the aforementioned subsamples are re-
ported in table 4. Note that we only report 2SLS results in this table. Columns (1)
and (2) include results for the sub-samples of non-competitive and competitive routes,
respectively. Columns (3) and (4) report results for homogeneous and heterogeneous
routes in terms of the passenger mix, respectively.
Focusing on competition, we observe that the coecient on AveragePrice variable
is only signicant for non-competitive markets. Given the panel nature of our dataset,
this result means that on markets we classied as competitive, LCCs' average fare
quote levels do not aect the realized load factors; whereas on the non-competitive
routes pricing does have an eect. This result is reminiscent of the `price-taker' rm
20Table 4: Dierent market conditions. Dependent variable: Load factor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non Compet. Competitive Homog. Heterog.
Routes Routes Routes Routes
Average price 0.296*** 0.133 0.309*** 0.139
(0.104) (0.120) (0.103) (0.108)
Yield management -0.748 4.686*** -2.320 2.508**
(1.384) (1.534) (2.142) (1.016)
Winter peak (Xmas) -1.176 2.397 -1.294 5.047**
(3.062) (2.128) (2.414) (2.405)
Spring peak (Easter) 0.462 2.664* -0.555 3.386**
(1.527) (1.597) (1.584) (1.484)
Summer peak (Mid-August) 2.281*** 0.206 1.676** 0.655
(0.656) (0.637) (0.688) (0.807)
Sundays -1.747 4.968** -0.343 3.509
(1.843) (1.951) (1.542) (2.285)
Mondays 1.730 5.988*** 1.769 6.113***
(1.259) (1.130) (1.149) (1.341)
Tuesdays 0.074 0.352 -0.225 1.067***
(0.288) (0.300) (0.322) (0.327)
Thursdays 1.582** 3.704*** 1.575*** 3.735***
(0.683) (0.662) (0.555) (0.805)
Fridays -0.503 5.576*** 0.780 4.620***
(1.522) (1.566) (1.236) (1.762)
Saturdays -0.917 4.834*** 0.629 2.936**
(1.420) (1.266) (1.246) (1.360)
R2 0.155 0.062 0.116 0.102
Cragg-Donald F-stat 54.336 64.875 22.822 113.558
Hansen 2 0.059 2.521 0.145 0.494
Hansen p-value 0.808 0.112 0.703 0.482
Observations 55382 53697 53347 40477
(a) Model (1) subsample of non-competitive routes, Model (2) subsample of competitive routes, Model
(3) subsample of homogeneous routes, Model (4) subsample of heterogeneous routes.
(b) Estimation technique: ight-code xed eects two-stage least squares with standard errors in
parentheses, robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, clustered by route-week.
(c) See text for discussion of instruments for Average price and Yield management.
(d) Coecients *** statistically signicant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
21on the competitive market versus the `price-setter' rm with market power. Of course,
an important qualication here is that the average fare quote is only an approximation
of the actual prices paid by the travelers. Quantitatively, an interquartile dierence
increase of AveragePrice on the markets classied as not competitive is associated with
a raise of the occupancy rate by 9.73 percent.
Our results also reveal that YM variable is not signicant in non-competitive mar-
kets, whilst it has a signicant impact on the competitive routes. This outcome is
consistent with the idea that on competitive markets the airlines will use YM inter-
ventions to eectively steal market share from its competitors. For this reason, we
will refer to this case as the \market-stealing eect". Specically, one standard devi-
ation increase in YM variable on markets classied as competitive is associated with
about 4.4 percent increase in load factor. Coming back to our illustrative example of
an 189-seat Ryanair ight, one price drop on a competitive market will lead to about
9.5 additional sold seats. Interestingly, even though price drops appear to be more
eective on competitive routes, they are not more frequent on markets with a lot of
competition as compared to routes with little competition. In fact, we observe about
the same number of price drops on competitive and non-competitive routes, by our
classication.
Columns (3) and (4) of table 4 report the results for sub-samples of homogeneous
and heterogeneous routes, respectively.
In markets with highly homogeneous consumers (as we indicated above, this sub-
sample is dominated by leisure/tourists markets) what drives the determination of
the load factor is mainly the price level. Quantitatively, an interquartile dierence
increase of AveragePrice is associated with an increase of LoadFactor by 11.28 percent in
homogeneous routes. This is consistent with the general wisdom that leisure passengers
are price sensitive.
However, when demand heterogeneity is large, the YM variable becomes highly
signicant. Price change is a way meant to attract customers with a larger dispersion
in their willingness to pay, which is unknown to the airline a priori. The price drops
are thus probes to test current levels of demand. Note that the marginal eect of
the YM variable is similar to that one for the whole sample: one standard deviation
increase in the YM variable leads to about 2.4 percent increase in the realized load
factor in the sub-sample of heterogeneous routes, versus 2 percent in the full sample.
Interestingly, Christmas and Easter dummies are highly signicant in the case of high
22demand heterogeneity, showing that the peak demand eect appears stronger when
passengers are heterogeneous.
With respect to the day of the week indicator variables, we observe that the cor-
responding coecients are mostly positive and signicant in the sub-samples of com-
petitive routes and markets with heterogeneous consumers. This suggests that the
Wednesday-eect is also stronger on those markets.
6.3 Robustness Checks
6.3.1 General
The main results thus far are as follows.
 When we consider the entire sample, both average price and YM intervention
positively and statistically signicantly impact the realized load factors.
 When we split the sample according to the degree of competition between the
airlines, it appears that the load factor is responsive to price but not to YM
on non-competitive routes. On competitive markets, however, YM aects the
load factor, and average price does not have a statistically signicant eect. The
estimates from the competitive markets suggest that the airlines may use YM
to benet from a market share stealing eect. Interestingly, even though YM as
we dene it is not as eective on non-competitive routes, it is not practiced less
frequently on those markets, as compared to the markets in which competition
among the airlines is high.
 When we focus on demand heterogeneity, the determination of the load factor
in homogenous markets is mainly driven by the ight's price level, whilst when
demand heterogeneity is large, the YM variable becomes highly statistically sig-
nicant; that is, YM appears more eective with a larger dispersion in the pas-
sengers' willingness to pay.
In this subsection we will implement the following two robustness checks:
 Use a weighted average oered fare instead of the simple average fare. Since the
distribution of passengers purchasing their ticket may vary across the booking
periods (for instance, more tickets might be bought closer to the ight departure
23date than further away from it, or vice versa), we assume dierent demand distri-
butions across booking days (i.e., we assign dierent weights to each oered fare
in dierent booking days), and re-calculate the average oered prices accordingly.
This also addresses the issue of potential interpretation of our measure of YM as a
way to implement inter-temporal price discrimination. As we noted above, price
drops closer to the departure date are most likely to represent exercise of YM, so
stronger relationship between price drops and load factors in regressions putting
more weight on observations closer to the ight departure date will strengthen
our story.
 Replace the average price with FareGap, i.e., the dierence between the highest
and the lowest fare quotes for a given ight on a given date. This variable aims
to capture elements of the second moment in the distribution of fares.
6.3.2 Weighted Average Price
The major dierence among the four models in Table 5 lies in the degree of importance
assigned to fare quotes observed closer to the ight date. Specically, Model (1) in
Table 5 assigns a 20% cumulative weight to early booking period (booking days 70-
49), a 40% one to middle booking period (booking days 42-14), and a 40% one to late
booking period (10-1 booking days). Model (2)'s weights are: 30% for early booking
period, 40% for middle booking period, and 30% for late booking period. Next, Model
(3) computes weighted average assigning 35% to early, 40% to middle, and 25% to late
booking periods. Finally, Model (4)'s weights for the three booking periods are 40%,
40%, and 20%, respectively. That is, as we shift from Model (1) towards Model (4)
we give more weight to the early booking period and less weight to the late booking
period in calculation of the weighted average fare.
We can clearly see that changing the weights of the fare quotes in calculating the
average oered price does not in any fundamental way aect the previously reported
results for our key variables. Further, our reweighing does not qualitatively change the
eect of average price on load factor. However, note that the estimated eect of YM
interventions is quantitatively stronger the higher the weight given to the late quotes
in the calculation of mean oered price. This nding appears to reect the fact that
price drops are more frequent the further away from the departure date the drop is
implemented. When fare quotes at the time price drops occur more regularly are not
weighed heavily, the eect of price decreases stands out more profoundly.
24Table 5: Weighted average price. Dependent Variable: Load factor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weighted average price 0.227*** 0.240*** 0.247*** 0.254***
(0.076) (0.080) (0.082) (0.085)
Yield management 2.310*** 2.057** 1.920** 1.776*
(0.884) (0.943) (0.977) (1.015)
Winter peak (Xmas) 0.892 0.608 0.455 0.295
(1.807) (1.899) (1.950) (2.005)
Spring peak (Easter) 1.409 1.289 1.225 1.159
(1.110) (1.150) (1.172) (1.195)
Summer peak (Mid-August) 1.121** 1.091** 1.074** 1.056**
(0.463) (0.456) (0.453) (0.449)
Sundays 0.988 0.939 0.914 0.888
(1.411) (1.428) (1.438) (1.449)
Mondays 3.730*** 3.714*** 3.706*** 3.699***
(0.889) (0.894) (0.898) (0.901)
Tuesdays 0.222 0.216 0.213 0.210
(0.207) (0.209) (0.210) (0.211)
Thursdays 2.564*** 2.555*** 2.550*** 2.546***
(0.492) (0.495) (0.497) (0.499)
Fridays 2.301** 2.263** 2.243* 2.224*
(1.139) (1.152) (1.159) (1.167)
Saturdays 1.802* 1.708* 1.658 1.607
(0.974) (1.004) (1.021) (1.039)
R2 0.151 0.141 0.134 0.126
Cragg-Donald F-stat 97.484 100.692 101.607 101.927
Hansen 2 1.834 1.741 1.691 1.639
Hansen p-value 0.176 0.187 0.193 0.200
Observations 109079 109079 109079 109079
(a) Models (1)-(4) dier in weights used in calculation of average price. See text for description.
(b) Estimation technique: ight-code xed eects two-stage least squares with standard errors in
parentheses, robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, clustered by route-week.
(c) Same instruments were used as elsewhere in the paper.
(d) Coecients *** statistically signicant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
256.3.3 Using price range instead of average price
Table 6 reports estimation results of our specication, where AveragePrice is replaced
with the variable FareGap, i.e., the dierence between the highest and the lowest fare
quotes for a given ight on a given date. We can expect that average oered price
might not capture the impact of the airline's pricing policy on the realized load factor.
By keeping the price low initially and increasing it to higher levels later on when the
price insensitive customers show up, the airline might be able to achieve higher load
factors than it would be by keeping the price constant as the departure date approaches.
Alternatively, high fare gap means that seats in the lower-priced categories have been
sold out, and the airline has for this particular ight been selling more expensive seats,
presumably closer to the date of the ight departure.
We generally expect a positive sign on the FareGap variable. Since price range
can also be correlated with the error term, we employ the same instrumental variable
approach as elsewhere in this study, and report 2SLS xed eects results in Table 6.
When we replace the average price with the range of oered fares, we see the
following changes in our estimation results. First, the range of fare quotes signicantly
aects load factor not only for the entire sample, but also for all the sub-samples
employed. Recall that we did not observe any signicant eect of average price for
the sub-samples of non-competitive and heterogeneous routes. Notably, the estimated
eect of range of fare quotes remains higher in the non-competitive markets sub-sample.
As far as the eect of yield management is concerned, we continue not to observe any
statistically important association for the non-competitive routes sub-sample. The
coecient of the YM variable is the largest in the sub-sample of competitive routes,
thereby supporting the previous results that YM may play a crucial role as an eective
competitive strategy. Dierentiation of routes in terms of consumer heterogeneity, at
the same time, no longer produces strikingly dierent results, judging by the relative
magnitudes of the corresponding coecients on YM variable. We also note that the
magnitude of the YM variable coecients for the entire sample, and for sub-samples
of competitive and heterogeneous markets is very similar to what we have obtained
previously.
26Table 6: Fare gap (Max - min fares). Dependent variable: Load factor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Non Compet. Competitive Homog. Heterog.
Sample Routes Routes Routes Routes
Fare gap 0.173*** 0.196*** 0.140*** 0.182*** 0.148***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015)
Yield management 2.957*** 1.172 4.795*** 2.237** 2.141**
(0.704) (1.016) (1.022) (1.138) (0.941)
Winter peak (Xmas) 4.140*** 4.304*** 3.652*** 3.487*** 6.002***
(0.646) (0.833) (0.961) (0.940) (0.949)
Spring peak (Easter) 3.664*** 3.644*** 3.608*** 2.987*** 4.405***
(0.456) (0.581) (0.726) (0.614) (0.803)
Summer peak (Mid-August) 0.883** 1.122** 0.653 0.945* 0.666
(0.402) (0.497) (0.584) (0.556) (0.718)
Sundays 2.617*** 1.193*** 4.506*** 1.865*** 3.791***
(0.291) (0.362) (0.456) (0.362) (0.508)
Mondays 4.630*** 3.354*** 5.838*** 3.549*** 5.950***
(0.232) (0.292) (0.352) (0.302) (0.395)
Tuesdays 0.585*** 0.603*** 0.509** 0.439** 1.192***
(0.172) (0.228) (0.259) (0.220) (0.291)
Thursdays 2.778*** 2.144*** 3.403*** 2.112*** 3.484***
(0.188) (0.255) (0.266) (0.241) (0.332)
Fridays 3.367*** 1.560*** 5.206*** 2.177*** 4.727***
(0.270) (0.349) (0.401) (0.366) (0.441)
Saturdays 3.081*** 1.527*** 4.787*** 2.571*** 3.259***
(0.278) (0.342) (0.439) (0.383) (0.460)
R2 0.108 0.125 0.084 0.111 0.133
Cragg-Donald F-stat 336.814 158.223 179.957 99.620 207.433
Hansen 2 4.651 1.617 4.996 3.312 1.389
Hansen p-value 0.098 0.446 0.082 0.191 0.499
Observations 109079 55382 53697 53347 40477
(a) Models: (1) - full sample; (2) - subsample of non-competitive routes; (3) - subsample of competitive
routes; (4) - subsample of homogeneous routes; (5) - subsample of heterogeneous routes.
(b) Estimation technique: ight-code xed eects two-stage least squares with standard errors in
parentheses, robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, clustered by route-week.
(c) Same instruments were used as elsewhere in the paper.
(d) Coecients *** statistically signicant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
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This paper oers the rst empirical study of the eectiveness of yield management
in the airline industry. We demonstrate that the practice of adjusting fares and seat
inventories is eective in increasing the ight load factors; we quantify this eect, and
determine whether it depends on some broadly dened market characteristics. We
combine information on the evolution of oered priced as the ight departure day
approaches with the data on realized load factors for over 100,000 unique ights on
over 100 routes over one year. A unique feature of our dataset is that it comes from the
European low-cost carriers. These airlines focus on direct ights, do not incorporate
network consideration into their pricing strategy, sell all their tickets as strictly non-
refundable contracts, and do not price discriminate between passengers traveling one-
way versus round-trip.
We thus observe price quotes in an environment most closely resembling the theoret-
ical exposition of pricing under xed capacity and uncertain demand. We pick the most
straightforward indicator of yield management - drops in fare quotes as the departure
date nears. Price drop is a clear indication that demand realization does not proceed
as expected, requiring involvement of a yield manager. The reason for picking the most
obvious indicator of yield management (instead of evaluating how dierent the price
path for a particular ight is relative to some estimated `average' pricing prole) is
simple. If we fail to observe eectiveness of this technique where it is denitely applied,
then we can be quite certain that yield management is not very helpful. If we however
see that the yield manager is able to increase the realized load factor by dropping the
fare quotes, then this result opens the door to future research on the issue.
We indeed detect that exercise of yield management (as dened in our study) by the
airlines leads to higher load factor. Specically, one standard deviation increase in the
yield management variable raises load factor by about 2 percent. Yield management
appears to be more eective on more competitive routes, and on markets with het-
erogeneous consumers. The former result is however somewhat more robust than the
latter. On competitive routes, one standard deviation increase in yield management
variable is associated with nearly 5 percent increase in load factor.
We must note that, even though our paper reports evidence supporting eectiveness
of yield management, an important qualication of our results is that we do not rule
out intertemporal price discrimination. Our ndings do not mean that the airlines
do not price discriminate. Nor can we condently state that we have been able to
28investigate the eect of dierent manifestations of yield management presented in the
literature. Indeed, we have only focused on instances where this technique is clearly
visible in our data. We leave the question of whether and to what degree the airlines
price discriminate open; addressing this issue will probably require more detailed data
than what we have now.
Our study is the rst exploration of eectiveness of a pricing technique known to be
used in the important and visible airline industry. Yield management is also applicable
to, and used by, although to somewhat less extent, railroads, hotels, and rental car
companies. Empirical analysis of this phenomenon is lacking, and will both help rms
apply yield management more eectively, and shed light on the extent to which price
dispersion in the relevant industries is the result of price discrimination. Ultimately,
our study is beginning to address the clearly policy relevant question of the extent of
exercise of market power in industries characterized by xed short-run capacity and
uncertain demand.
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Appendix
30Table 7: First-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Av. Price Yield Man. Av. Price Yield Man.
Winter peak (Xmas) 24.451*** 0.238*** 19.636*** 0.292***
(1.224) (0.038) (1.475) (0.046)
Spring peak (Easter) 11.931*** 0.004 11.125*** 0.039
(0.688) (0.028) (0.882) (0.047)
Summer peak (Mid-August) -3.292*** 0.049 -2.853*** 0.004
(0.406) (0.038) (0.515) (0.051)
Sundays 17.656*** 0.115*** 17.028*** 0.131***
(0.344) (0.015) (0.494) (0.022)
Mondays 9.869*** -0.024* 8.609*** 0.010
(0.229) (0.013) (0.311) (0.017)
Tuesdays 0.958*** -0.009 0.844*** 0.012
(0.138) (0.011) (0.175) (0.014)
Thursdays 5.731*** 0.063*** 5.387*** 0.091***
(0.148) (0.011) (0.197) (0.015)
Fridays 14.042*** 0.115*** 13.451*** 0.160***
(0.251) (0.013) (0.335) (0.019)
Saturdays 12.824*** 0.138*** 11.305*** 0.183***
(0.292) (0.014) (0.413) (0.019)
Jet fuel 0.191*** -0.004 0.189* 0.006*
(0.070) (0.003) (0.099) (0.003)
Average price falls 17.385*** 2.367*** 21.986*** 2.509***
(2.249) (0.126) (3.230) (0.176)
Holiday period -1.561*** -0.021*** -1.521*** -0.014
(0.167) (0.008) (0.196) (0.011)
R2 0.204 0.024 0.215 0.030
Observations 109079 109079 53697 53697
(a) Columns (1) and (2) are rst-stage estimates of Model (2) in table 3; Columns (3) and (4) are rst-stage
estimates of Model (2) in table 4.
(b) The regressions include ight-code xed eects. Robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity and serial
correlation in parentheses, clustered by route-week.
(c) Coecients *** statistically signicant at 1%, ** at 5% and *at 10%.
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